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Abstract
	The	island	of	Cyprus	is,	throughout	the	history,	supposed	and	believed	to	be	that	
of	the	immigration	and	that	of	the	issues.	Taking	a	glance	at	the	last	century,	it	is	obviously	
seen	that,	even	though	the	island	seems	to	be	out	of	the	wars	and	the	struggles	in	some	points,	
the	 island	 itself	 just	 takes	 a	 place	 in	 the	 very	midst	 of	 those	 above-mentioned	 struggles,	
disputes	 and	 the	 conflicts.	 Especially	 starting	 from	 the	WWI,	 the	 island	 occupies	 a	 very	
unusual	place	 both	 in	 the	 conflict	 of	 interest	 and	 the	 struggles	 of	 the	 island-centered	 and	
various	conflicts	surrounding	Cyprus,	and	in	addition	to	 the	Enosis	conflict	caused	by	the	
Greek	Cypriots,	the	efforts	for	the	annexation	of	the	island	to	Greece,	and	the	British	policy	
towards	Greece	all	 increase	 the	problems	more	and	more.	Considering	 the	position	of	 the	
island	especially	starting	from	April	1,	1955	on	which	Greek	Cypriot	terrorist	organization	
named	EOKA	started	terrorist	activities	not	only	against	British,	and	Turkish	Cypriots	but	
also	 against	Greek	Cypriot	 ones	 up	 to	August	 16,	 1960	 on	which	 the	Republic	 of	Cyprus	
was	founded	on	the	guarantee	of	the	UK,	Turkey	and	Greece,	the	island	spent	a	long	way	of	
atrocity	and	bloodyshed	period	causing	the	death	of	a	good	many	innocent	persons	on	the	
island.	Turkish	Cypriots	trying	to	get	rid	of	the	atrocity	committed	against	themselves	have	
also	 established	 some	underground	organizations	 such	as	Volkan,	 9	Eylül	 (9th	September	
symbolizing	the	salvation	of	Nicosia	as	well	as	that	of	Izmir),	and	Türk	Mukavemet	Teşkilatı	
(Turkish	Resistance	Organization)	 but	 except	 the	 last	 one,	 all	 the	 efforts	 have	 come	 to	 an	
end	with	 failure	 since	EOKA	was	backed	by	Greece	and	donated	by	 the	well-trained	and	
experienced	military	personnel.	Despite	the	fact	that	Republic	of	Cyprus	has	been	founded,	
Greek	Cypriot	attacks	against	the	Turkish	people	continue	and	the	republic	comes	to	an	end	
with	a	tragic	end,	that	is	to	say,	with	Bloody	Christmas.	As	the	first	and	the	last	president	of	
Republic	of	Cyprus,	and	Archbishop	Makarios	frankly	declared,	Republic	of	Cyprus	seemed	
to	be	 just	a	springing	point	 towards	the	annexation	of	 the	 island	to	Greece	at	 long	 last.	 In	
this	scientific	study,	it	is	aimed,	in	priority,	starting	from	the	first	day	of	1963,	to	focus	on	the	
political	developments	and	the	traps	created	by	Makarios	himself	up	to	the	end	of	1963	in	the	
light	of	the	US	documents.
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Öz
	Kıbrıs	adası	tarih	boyunca	göçler	ve	sorunlar	adası	olarak	bilinmiştir.	Son	yüzyıla	
göz	 atıldığında	görülecektir	 ki	 savaşın	ve	mücadelelerin	dışındaymış	gibi	 görünse	de	 ada	
her	zaman	kendisini	çatışmaların,	savaşların	ve	mücadelelerin	tam	orta	yerinde	bulmuştur.	
Özellikle	 Birinci	 Dünya	 Savaşı’ndan	 başlayarak	 ada	 hem	 menfaat	 çatışmalarının	 hem	
de	ada	merkezli	başka	 çatışmaların	 tam	ortasında	yer	alır.	Ayrıca	Kıbrıslı	Rumların	adayı	
Yunanlaştırmaya	 yönelik	 Enosis	 girişimleri	 yanınnda	 İngilizlerin	 Yunanistan’a	 yönelik	
politikası	da	ada	etrafındaki	sorunları	kat	be	kat	artırır.	Adanın	durumunu	özellikle	1	Nisan	
1955	tarihinden	itibaren	başlayarak	sadece	İngilizlere	ve	Türklere	değil	kendilerine	yardımcı	
olmayan	 Rumlara	 yönelik	 de	 terör	 girişimlerine	 başlayan	 ve	 16	 Ağustos	 1960	 tarihinde	
Türkiye,	 Yunanistan	 ve	 İngiltere	 garantörlüğünde	Kıbrıs	 Cumhuriyeti	 kuruluncaya	 kadar	
devam	eden	EOKA	saldırılarına	göz	atılacak	olursa	ada	pek	çok	masum	insanın	ölümüne	yol	
açan	saldırılar	ve	tedhiş	eylemleriyle	sarsılmıştır.	Kıbrıslı	Türkler	bir	yandan	bu	saldırılardan	
kurtulmaya	çalışırken	bir	yandan	da	Volkan,	9	Eylül	ve	Türk	Mukavemet	Teşkilatı	gibi	yeraltı	
teşkilatları	kurmuşlardır.	 	Öte	yandan	sonuncusu	hariç	bütün	organizasyonlar	Yunanistan	
destekli	 profesyonel	 EOKA	yapılanması	 karşısında	 başarısız	 olmuştur.	Öte	 yandan	Kıbrıs	
Cumhuriyeti	kurulmasına	rağmen	Kıbrıs	Türklerine	yönelik	Rum	saldırıları	devam	eder	ve	
cumhuriyet	 trajik	bir	olayla,	Kanlı	Noel	denilen	 süreçte	 sona	erer.	Kıbrıs	Cumhuriyeti’nin	
ilk	 ve	 son	 cumhurbaşkanı	 Makarios’un	 da	 açıkça	 ifade	 ettiği	 üzere	 Kıbrıs	 Cumhuriyeti	
adanın	Yunanistan’a	 ilhakı	 için	bir	atlama	tahtası	olmuştur.	Bu	bilimsel	çalışmada	1963’ün	
ilk	gününden	itibaren	yaşanılan	siyasi	gelişmeler	ve	Makarios	tarafından	yaratılan	tuzaklar	
Amerikan	belgeleri	ışığında	irdelenecektir.																																																																	
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kıbrıs, Kıbrıslı Türkler, EOKA, Makarios, Kanlı Noel.
 
Introduction
	In	its	combination	of	scenic	beauty	and	romantic	historical	associations,	
Cyprus	holds	a	unique	position	among	the	islands	of	the	Mediterranean1.	From	
the	dawn	of	history	Cyprus	has	been	the	meeting	place	of	East	and	West.	The	
modern	traveler	will,	as	the	poet	naturally	expresses	in	his	line,	find	it	ideal	alike	
for	capturing	the	atmosphere	of	the	past	as	well	as	purely	enjoying	peace	and	
relaxation	on	its	sandy	beaches	or	among	its	pine-clad	forests	under	the	seldom-
hidden	Mediterranean	sun.	On	the	other	hand,	Cyprus	has	never,	unfortunately	
been	such	an	island	of	silence	throughout	the	history.	Especially	taking	World	
War	I	and	World	War	II	periods	into	consideration,	it	is	hardly	possible	for	almost	
all	manner	of	people	to	say	or	to	confess	that	the	island	of	paradise	has	got	such	
a	shelter	to	relax	for	the	people	living	on.	The	island	of	Cyprus	has	always	been	
that	 of	 immigration	 and	 the	 problems	 throughout	 the	 history.	 Starting	 from	
1	 	Robin	Parker,	Aphrodite’s Realm,	Nicosia,	1962,	p.	XXXIX.
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April	 1,	 1955,	 the	 rising	 EOKA	 organization	 and	 activities	 firstly	 against	 the	
British	subjects	on	the	island	and	then	against	Turkish	and	Greek	Cypriots,	who	
did	not	support	EOKA	activities,	caused	several	disruptions	in	communication	
and	 communication	means.	 Despite	 the	 founding	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Cyprus	
dated	16th	August	1960	seemed	to	put	an	end	to	the	political	crisis	at	first	soon	
problems	continued	to	exist	leading	to	Turkey’s	intervention	of	15th	July	1974	
on	the	island	to	protect	Turkish	Cypriot	rights2.
Starting	 from	 1st	April	 1955	 up	 to	 1960,	 EOKA	 terrorist	 organization	
turned	the	island	of	Cyprus	into	a	bloody	spot,	and	the	life	on	the	island	became	
very	unbearable3	for	the	Turkish	community	as	well	as	the	Greek	Cypriots	and	
the	British	 communities.	On	 the	other	hand,	 at	 two	 conferences	held	 in	both	
London	 and	 Zurich,	 the	 Greek	 Prime	 Minister	 Constantine	 Karamanlis	 and	
Turkish	 Prime	Minister	 Adnan	Menderes	 negotiated	 a	 settlement	 of	 Cyprus	
issue,	consulting	Archbishop	Makarios,	and	Dr.	Fazıl	Küçük.	Finally	the	treaties	
were	signed	by	the	above-mentioned	leaders	and	by	the	British	Prime	Minister	
Harold	 Macmillan	 on	 February	 19,	 1959	 so	 as	 to	 establish	 an	 independent,	
bi-communal	Cyprus	Republic4.	 As	 soon	 as	 the	 treaties	were	 put	 signatures,	
everybody	involved	in	the	issue	on	the	island	thought	that	Enosis	idea	and	the	
obsession	of	Megali	Idea	would	officially	be	abandoned	by	the	Greek	Cypriots,	
and	Turkish	Cypriots	would	get	 the	 legal	protection	they	always	needed	and	
longed	for5.	Unfortunately	none	of	these	happened,	and	neither	did	the	Greek	
Cypriots	leave	their	Megali	Idea	purpose	nor	did	the	Turkish	Cypriots	live	in	
safety6.		Thus	the	new	Republic	of	Cyprus	came	into	being	on	August	16,	1960,	18	
months	after	the	signing	of	the	London	Agreement.	Republic	of	Cyprus,	being	a	
bilingual,	with	Turkish	and	Greek	languages,	was	administered	by	Archbishop	
2	 Charles	Foley,	Island in Revolt,	Longman	Yay.,	Londra,	s.180.	
3	 Charles	Foley,	The Memoirs of General Grivas,	Longman	Yay.,	Londra,	1964,	s.133.	Charles	Foley,	
Guerilla Warfare and  EOKA  Struggle; General Grivas ,	Longman	Yay.,	Londra,	1964,	s.	109.
4	 The	articles	of	the	treaty	were	also	supposed	to	be	very	original	and	unique,	not	copied	or	
compiled	 from	various	 sources,	 but	 the	most	 important	 characteristics	 of	 the	 treaty	was	
that	the	essential	articles	of	the	treaty	could	not	be	changed	without	the	agreement	and	the	
mutual	consensus	even	if	it	was	supposed	to	be	imposed	by	Britain,	Greece	and	Turkey	as	an	
impossible	constitution.	By	the	way,	this	is	the	most	important	point	here,	and	for	example,	
the	acceptance	of	the	Greek	Cypriot	community	to	the	European	Union	as	“the	Republic	
of	Cyprus”	is	objected	by	Turkey	and	Turkish	Republic	of	Northern	Cyprus.	Turning	back	
again	 to	 the	main	point;	before	signing	 the	 treaty	 in	London,	Archbishop	Makarios	had,	
in	 reality,	 some	 certain	 reservations	 with	 regard	 to	 certain	 provisions	 contained	 in	 the	
agreements,	and	he	offered	some	grave	amendments	which	were	not	accepted.	Therefore	
he	was	 completely	 reluctant	 to	 sign	 the	 agreements.	Out	of	 the	discussions	and	debates	
here,	it	was	also	said	in	Cyprus	even	today	that	Makarios	was	forced	to	sign	the	agreements	
since	EOKA	leader	Georges	Grivas	threatened	him	showing	some	indecent	pictures	of	the	
archbishop,	 so	he	 seemed	 to	approve	 the	 treaties	a	 little	bit	unwillingly.	Clement	Dodd,	
Storm	Clouds	over	Cyprus;	A	Briefing,	Eothen	Huntingdon,	Cambridgeshire,	2002,	p.11.	
See	 also	 John	 Reddaway,	Burdened with Cyprus; The British Connection,	 Rustem	 Brothers	
Bookstore,	Nicosia,	2004,	p.124.		
5	 Byford	Jones,	Grivas and The Story of EOKA,	Robert	Hale	Limited	Yay.,	Londra,	1959,	s.14.										
6	 Sir	Hugh	Foot,	A Start In Freedom,	Hoddr	and	Stoughton,	Londra,	s.143.
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Makarios	as	the	first	President	of	the	country,	and	a	Turkish	vice-president-	Dr.	
Fazıl	Küçük	under	 the	supervision	of	a	Council	of	Ministers,	 seven	of	whom	
were	from	the	Greek	Cypriot	community	and	3	of	whom	from	Turkish	Cypriots	
according	to	%70-%30	proportions	that	seemed	to	be	adapted	for	all	the	official	
assignments,	 as	 would	 be	 applied	 for	 the	 police	 and	 security	 forces	 of	 the	
country.	The	House	of	Representatives,	on	the	other	hand,	consisted	of	50	seats,	
35	of	which	were	occupied	by	the	Greek	Cypriots,	and	15	of	which	were	taken	
by	the	Turkish	Cypriots.	Similar	to	the	Presidency,	the	president	of	the	House	of	
Representatives	was	a	Greek	Cypriot	while	the	vice-president	was	to	be	a	Turkish	
Cypriot	deputy.	Out	of	the	official	and	legitimate	position	of	the	government,	
For	 the	purpose	 of	 the	 local	 administration,	 the	five	major	 towns	of	Nicosia,	
Limassol,	Famagusta,	Larnaca,	and	Paphos	had	their	own	separate	Turkish	and	
Greek	Cypriot	municipalities	to	be	elected.	Thus,	a	Treaty	of	Guarantee	between	
Turkey,	Greece	and	Great	Britain	was	put	 into	 the	signature	so	as	 to	provide	
“the	 recognition	 and	 maintenance	 of	 the	 independence,	 territorial	 integrity,	
and	security	of	the	Republic	of	Cyprus	by	preventing	direct	or	indirect	Enosis	
or	Partition	or	 annexation	by	any	of	 the	 three	guarantor	 states”7.	Besides	 the	
guarantee	of	the	social	and	legitimate	situation	on	the	island,	a	Treaty	of	Alliance	
between	 the	 above-mentioned	 guarantor	 states	 was	 signed	 and	 a	 military	
contingent	of	950	Greek	and	650	Turkish	soldiers	 landed	on	the	 island	under	
the	command	of	a	Tripartite	Headquarters.	The	command	of	the	joint	army	was	
to	be	rotated	annually	among	the	guarantor	states,	and	the	newly-established	
Cyprus	Army	was	to	be	trained	by	them	as	well8.
Unfortunately	Archbishop	Makarios	who	was	 thought	 to	be	a	man	of	
peace	by	some	since	he	broke	the	relations	against	Georges	Grivas	who	up	to	
1960	 ruled	 and	 commanded	 EOKA	 terrorist	 organization	 backed	 by	 Greece	
appeared	once	more	that	he	was	still	committed	to	bringing	about	Enosis	as	did	
Minister	of	Interior	Polikarpos	Yeorgadjis	who	was	the	area	chief	of	Nicosia9, 
declaring	frankly	and	with	no	hesitation	on	April	1,	196010;
“The realization of our hopes and aspirations is not complete under the Zurich 
and London Agreements. The glorious liberation struggle, whose fifth anniversary we 
celebrate today, has secured for us advanced bastions and impregnable strongholds for 
our independence. From these bastions we will continue the struggle to complete victory.” 
7	 Pierre	Oberling,	The Road to Bellapais,	Columbia	University	Press,	New	York,	1982,	p.66.	See	
also	PN	Vanesiz,	Cyprus;Crime without Punishment;	Regal	Printing	House,	Hong	Kong,	2000,	
p.70.	Friedrich	August,	Modern	Irregular	Warfare,	New	York,	1986,	s.92-102.
8	 Ulvi	Keser,	1955-1963 Kıbrıs’ta Yeraltı Faaliyetleri ve Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı,	IQ	Publications,	
Istanbul,	2007,	p.56-125.
9	 Rauf	R.	Denktaş,	The Cyprus Problem,	Cyrep	Publications,	Nicosia,	2004,	p.24.
10	 Similarly	Archbishop	Makarios	made	another	oath	at	the	Phaneromeny	Church	in	Nicosia	
on	October	20,	1950	saying	“I	take	the	holy	oath	that	I	shall	work	for	the	birth	of	our	national	
freedom	and	shall	never	waiver	from	our	policy	of	annexing	Cyprus	to	mother	Greece.”	
Special	Committee	on	Cyprus	Affairs,	(Edited	by	Suat	Bilge)	“Cyprus; Past, Present, Future”, 
Ajans	Türk	Matbaası,	Ankara,	1963,	p.	9.	See	also	Pierre	Oberling,	ibid,	p.68.
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What	he	announced	as	a	president	not	as	an	ordinary	EOKA	member	
there	 showed	 that	 the	 struggle	 for	Megali	 Idea	and	 for	 the	annexation	of	 the	
island	 to	 Greece	 would	 continue	 using	 all	 the	 possible	 means	 he	 has	 had.	
Similarly,	he	continued	to	threat	Turkish	Cypriots	and	cheer	the	Greek	Cypriots	
as	he	did	on	August	15,	196211;
“Greek Cypriots must continue to march forward to complete the work begun 
by the EOKA heroes. The struggle is continuing in a new form, and will go on until we 
achieve our goal.”
Similarly	he	 also	 adds	 that	 “Until	 this	 small	 Turkish	 community	 that	
forms	part	of	the	Turkish	race	which	has	been	the	terrible	enemy	of	Hellenism	is	
expelled,	the	duty	to	the	heroes	of	EOKA	cannot	be	considered	as	terminated”12. 
Archbishop	Makarios,	never	holding	his	official	positions	 impartially,	 instead	
of	 acquiring	 the	 importance	 and	 the	 necessity	 of	 the	 unity,	 and	 developing	
closer	 relations	between	Greek	and	Turkish	Cypriots13	 thus	made	mostly	use	
of	the	Greek	Cypriot	schools,	Cyprus	Broadcasting	Corporation,	all	the	official	
institutions,	associations,	and	the	organizations	so	as	 to	create	Greek	Cyprus,	
declaring	“Cyprus	is	Greek,	and	that	the	Turks	are	intruders.”	Not	the	Republic	
of	Cyprus	one	but	the	Greek	flag	hoisted	over	the	Presidential	Palace	in	additional	
to	Presidential	black	Cadillac,	bearing	the	number	plate	AK114.	What	Makarios	
and	his	 team	on	 the	 island	desired	 to	 do	was	 to	 present	 the	 situation	 to	 the	
United	Nations	and	argue	the	Zurich-London	Accords	claiming	that	the	accords	
had	never	been	submitted	for	approval	to	the	Cypriot	people,	and	the	principle	
of	 self-determination	which	can	be,	out	of	 the	ethnic	communities	 living	 in	a	
colonial	territory15,	a	noble	right	so	as	to	serve	the	highest	humanitarian	ideals	
so	 as	 to	 supply	 the	 freedom	 and	 the	 liberty	 of	 the	 people	 from	 the	 colonial	
administration	or	the	tyrannical	dictatorship	should	be	applied	to	see	the	will	of	
the	majority	of	the	people.	On	the	other	hand,	Makarios	realized	that	no	support	
from	the	UN	and	the	western	countries	would	come	for	his	demands,	and	he	
headed	 for	 the	 pro-Third	World	 and	 pro-Soviet	 foreign	 policy.	Makarios	 by	
the	way	 from	 the	 very	 beginning	 believed	 that	Turkish	Cypriots	 had	gained	
excessive	privileges	under	Constitution	and	did	not	intend	to	let	them	have	them.	
Makarios	had	also	not	permitted	full	implementation	of	provisions	relating	to	
civil	service,	taxation,	and	Cyprus	Army16.	The	chaos	and	turmoil	atmosphere	
over	the	island	then	got	darken	and	darken,	and	almost	all	the	decision-making	
and	decision-taking	authorities	were	all	controlled	and	assigned	by	Makarios.	
11	 Pierre	Oberling,	ibid,	p.68.
12	 John	Reddaway,	Ibid,	p.133.
13	 N.	C.	Lanitis,	Our Destiny;A Consideration of Some Problems Pertaining to Cyprus,	Nicosia,	1963,	p.4.
14	 H.	Scott	Gibbons,	Peace Without Honor,	Ada	Publishing	House,	Ankara,	1969,	p.	7.	See	also	H.	
Scott	Gibbons,	The Genocide Files,	Charles	Bravos	Publishers,	London,	December	1997,	p.7–48.	
15	 Metin	Tamkoç,	The Turkish Cypriot State;The Embodiment of the Right of Self-Determination,	K.	
Rustem	&	Brother	Publications,	London,	1988,	p.44.
16	 Telegram	from	the	Embassy	in	Cyprus	to	the	Department	of	State	 (DOS);	DOS,	CF	(CF),	
780A.00/1-1663.Confidential,	January	16,	1963	Nicosia.
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The	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs,	ambassadors	to	the	UN,	the	USA,	and	the	UK	
were	 all	 the	 Greek	 Cypriots,	 and	 Turkish	 community	 had	 no	 responsibility,	
control,	and	mission	over	them,	and	Turkish	Cypriots	were	all	convinced	that	
if	they	compromised	with	Makarios	on	municipalities,	their	rights	which	were	
being	put	aside	would	be	considered	again17:
“The clandestine recruiting, training and organizing of the Greek Cypriot 
‘secret army’ began early in 1961. Although the EOKA organization of the 1955-1959 
campaign had been disbanded, many of its weapons had never been handed over to the 
Cyprus Police and the loyalties and obligations of its cells remained intact. These cells 
became the cadres of the new force. In 1962, in the Trodos Mountains under the guidance 
of the Greek Cypriot officer-cadets of the Cyprus Army and using arms ‘borrowed’ from 
government armories. By December 1963, there were up to 10.000 Greek Cypriots who 
had been recruited and trained to some extent.”
The	 activities	 led	 and	 assisted	 by	 the	 former	 EOKA	 organizations	
clandestinely,	Makarios’	ignorance	to	see	Turkish	Cypriots’	rights	in	the	country,	
unjust	and	unequal	behaviors	towards	Turkish	community	finally	cause	a	good	
many	 controversies,	 all	 of	which	were	 certainly	 resisted	by	Turkish	Cypriots	
too	 such	 as	 the	 security	 services	 controversy,	 the	Armed	Forces	 controversy,	
the	civil	service	controversy,	the	municipalities	controversy,	the	tax	controversy,	
the	 Constitutional	 Court	 controversy.	 Thus	 Makarios	 entrusting	 Polykarpos	
Yeorgadjis18,	 Tassos	 Papadopoulos	 and	 Glafkos	 Klerides	 to	 prepare	 a	 plan	
named	Akritas	Plan,	firstly	published	and	appeared	on	April	21,	1966	by	 the	
Greek	 newspaper	 Patris,	 and	 signed	 by	 “The	Chief,	Akritas”	 so	 as	 to	 kill	 all	
the	Turkish	Cypriots	on	the	island	regardless	of	the	age,	sex,	status,	military	or	
civilian.	While	coming	closer	to	1963,	Turkish	Cypriots	would	live	the	dark	and	
bloody	days	deteriorating	more	and	more19;	
“…The plan was in fact a conspiracy to dissolve the Republic of Cyprus. It had 
three objectives; to get rid of the 1960 treaties so as to re-open the way to self-determination 
and eventual Enosis; to create the impression that the constitution was unworkable and 
then to amend it on this pretext so as to eliminate the powers it conferred on the Turks 
and to reduce them to the status of a politically impotent minority; and to suppress 
immediately and forcefully any Turkish reaction so as to create fait accompli before 
there could be any external intervention; if widespread clashed occurred, suppression 
of the Turkish Cypriots would be completed at once and would be accompanied by an 
immediate declaration of Enosis…”
17	 Pierre	Oberling,	ibid,	p.70.	See	also	Telegram	from	the	Embassy	in	Cyprus	to	the	DOS;	DOS,	
CF,	780A.00/1-1663.Confidential,	January	16,	1963	Nicosia.
18	 Yeorgadjis	 have	 clandestinely	 established	 within	 the	 Civil	 Service	 and	 Police	 Forces;	
a	 sophisticated	network	 of	 EOKA	members,	 and	prepared	 them	 for	 the	 final	 atatcks	 on	
Turkish	Cypriots	on	November	21,	1963.		Zenon	Stavrinides,	The Cyprus Conflict;National, 
Identity and Statehood, Cyrep	Publications,	Nicosia,	1999,	p.4.
19	 John	Reddaway,	Ibid,	p.134.	
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1963 And In The Eve Of The Bloody Events
Deterioration	of	the	situation	on	the	island,	and	Greek	Cypriot	ignorance	
brought	the	island	to	a	new	ambiguity,	and	Turkey	expressed	its	concerns	about	
the	 hardening	 of	 positions	 by	Greek	 and	Turkish	Cypriots,	 and	warned	 that	
Turkey	would	 support	 the	 Turkish	Cypriots	 naturally	 as	 a	 guarantor	 state20. 
Declaration	made	by	Turkey	caused	some	problems	in	the	USA	as	well,	and	the	
Department	 of	 State	 (DOS)	 was	 concerned	 lest	 current	 dispute	 between	 the	
communities	on	the	island	develop	into	serious	conflict	between	hardened	and	
irreconcilable	positions,	realizing	that	such	conflict	could	afford	opportunities	
for	 expansion	 communist	 power	 in	 Cyprus,	 endanger	 Greek	 and	 Turkish	
governments	and	seriously	weaken	NATO.21	The	US	thought	that	no	inflexible	
constitutional	 provisions	 and	 the	 solutions	 imposed	 from	 abroad	 would	 be	
suitable	to	solve	the	issue	but	the	pragmatic	adjustments	of	relations	between	
the	communities,	and	the	US	was	very	ready	against	any	effort,	drawing	the	US	
into	 the	 dispute,	 and	 to	 politely	 but	 firmly	 reject.	 The	 US	 government	 then	
pointed	out	some	certain	aspects	for	the	involved	parties,	expressed	for	Nicosia	
to	 avoid	 indications	undue	US	 concern,	 and	 counsel	moderation	and	mutual	
adjustment	to	the	leaders	of	the	communities.	Some	warnings	were	expressed	
for	 Athens	 that	 at	 convenient	 opportunities,	 they	 should	 continue	 counsel	
Government	of	Greece	to	urge	Makarios	to	seek	solution	with	Dr.	Küçük,	and	
some	 warnings	 for	 Turkey	 that	 Turkey	 should	 see	 American	 sympathy	 for	
difficult	situation	in	which	Turkey	has	been	placed;	Turkey	would	exercise	its	
influence	on	Dr.	Küçük	to	end	that	he	would	continue	to	seek	ad	hoc	compromise	
with	Makarios22.	Some	one	week	later,	Greek	Foreign	Minister	Averoff	expressed	
his	concern	that	the	Cyprus	situation	was	becoming	dangerous	and	stressed	that	
the	Greek	Government’s	desire	for	a	moderate	solution	and	its	efforts	to	restrain	
Makarios23.	But	Averoff	also	urged	the	US	to	restrain	Turkey	as	well	considering	
that	Prime	Minister	İnönü	would	completely	back	the	Turkish	Cypriot	leadership	
on	the	island.	The	US	Department	of	State	was	very	glad	for	Averoff’s	frankness	
in	 communicating	 his	 views	 on	 Cyprus	 as	 well	 as	 American	 Ambassador’s	
words	in	Athens,	saying	“I	told	Averoff	we	do	not	wish	to	become	involved	in	
situation,	 as	we	considered	 this	a	matter	 for	parties	 to	work	out,	 and	 the	US	
would	urge	all	the	parties	to	take	a	moderate	approach”24.	One	day	later,	Vice-
20	 Telegram	from	the	DOS	to	the	Embassy	in	Cyprus;	DOS,	CF,	780	A.001-763,	Confidential,	
January	9,	1963	Washington	DC.
21	 Telegram	from	the	DOS	to	the	Embassy	in	Cyprus;	DOS,	CF,	780	A.001-763,	Confidential,	
January	9,	1963	Washington	DC.
22	 Telegram	from	the	DOS	to	the	Embassy	in	Cyprus;	DOS,	CF,	780	A.001-763,	Confidential,	
January	9,	1963	Washington	DC.
23	 Telegram	from	the	DOS	to	the	Embassy	in	Greece;	DOS,	CF,	780A.00/1-1463.Confidential,	
January	15,	1963	Washington	DC.
24	 Telegram	from	the	DOS	to	the	Embassy	in	Greece;	DOS,	CF,	780A.00/1-1463.Confidential,	
January	15,	1963	Washington	DC.
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President	 Dr.	 Fazıl	 Küçük	 called	 American	 Ambassador	 to	make	 a	 courtesy	
visit,	 saying	 that	Turkish	Cypriots	during	 recent	 conversations	had	 sincerely	
tried	to	find	solution	within	Constitution,	by	agreeing	to	joint	boards	and	at	the	
same	 time	 maintaining	 separate	 municipal	 councils25.	 On	 the	 other	 hand	
Makarios	who	just	turned	back	from	Ankara	visit	insisted	that	there	could	be	no	
separate	municipal	councils,	and	had	endeavored	to	place	blame	for	breakdown	
of	 talks	on	Dr.	Küçük	by	saying	he	had	withdrawn	his	 consent.	Actually	Dr.	
Küçük	had	never	given	consent	 to	 the	abolishment	of	 separate	councils26.	On	
February	7,	1963,	American	Ambassador	in	Nicosia	telegrammed	his	capital	city	
that	 Turkish	Cypriot	 community	was	 very	 surprised	 and	dismayed	by	press	
reports	announcing	that	Government	of	Cyprus	might	withhold	400.000	pounds	
annual	grant	to	Turkish	Cypriot	communal	chamber	unless	municipalities	issue	
was	resolved27.	So	Dr.	Küçük	would	not	meet	with	Makarios	as	 threat	of	 this	
kind	would	make	it	politically	impossible	to	justify	to	Turkish	Cypriots	further	
discussion	with	Makarios,	and	Turkish	community	was	at	 loss	to	understand	
why	Makarios	was	creating	this	new	roadblock28.	On	the	other	hand,	Rauf	R.	
Denktaş	would	meet	and	discuss	with	Glafgos	Clerides	even	if	Dr.	Küçük	did	
not	wish	to	do	so.	Even	if	the	USA	tried	to	be	out	of	the	dispute	and	the	issues	in	
Cyprus,	the	Greek	party	had	a	great	insistence	to	force	them	for	an	intervention	
in	the	issue.	On	the	other	hand	the	US	ambassador	in	Nicosia	thought	that	such	
an	intervention	would	offer	no	new	prospects	for	the	agreement	but	cause	some	
delays	in	resolution	of	the	problem29.	Turkey	in	this	point	declares	to	the	USA	
that	infringement	or	the	deviation	from	constitution	was	once	allowed	it	would	
open	door	to	proposals	and	pressure	for	further	changes,	and	the	fundamental	
concern	was	that	breakdown	the	governmental	system	in	Cyprus	would	lead	to	
Enosis	“which	was	the	cause	of	the	long-standing	political	Cyprus	issue	and	the	
dangerous	Greek	fanaticism	derived	from	the	Megali	Idea,	aimed	at	achieving	
the	final	aim;	Enosis”30		with	Greece31.	A	few	days	later,	the	US	ambassador	in	
Nicosia	stated	that	the	municipalities	issue	in	Cyprus	reached	a	point	that	they	
25	 Telegram	from	the	Embassy	in	Cyprus	to	the	DOS;	DOS,	CF,	780A.00/1-1663.Confidential,	
January	16,	1963	Nicosia.
26	 	As	so	many	times	discussed,	the	USA	had	a	good	many	problems	to	tackle,	so	it	seemed	to	
be	very	reluctant	to	involve	in	and	the	ambassador	in	Nicosia	said	in	response	to	Dr.Küçük	
that	moderation	and	restraint	on	both	sides	in	reconciling	differences	of	opinion	would	be	
better	to	find	solutions	for	municipalities	within	framework	of	Constitution.
27	 Telegram	from	the	Embassy	 in	Cyprus	 to	 the	DOS;	DOS,	CF,	POL	18	Cyp.	Confidential,	
February	7,	1963,	Nicosia.
28	 Telegram	from	the	Embassy	 in	Cyprus	 to	 the	DOS;	DOS,	CF,	POL	18	Cyp.	Confidential,	
February	7,	1963,	Nicosia.
29	 Telegram	from	the	Embassy	 in	Cyprus	 to	 the	DOS;	DOS,	CF,	POL	18	Cyp.	Confidential,	
February	7,	1963,	Nicosia.
30	 Venhar	Keskin,	Besieged,Nicosia,	December	2004,	p.7.	
31	 For	 the	 Americans,	 another	 important	 aspect	 here	 was	 that	 Makarios’	 handling	 the	
municipality	question	has	caused	the	loss	of	faith	it	may	have	had	in	his	assurances	and	
good	intentions	towards	Turkish	community.	Telegram	from	the	Embassy	in	Cyprus	to	the	
DOS;DOS,	CF,	POL	18	Cyp.	Confidential,	February	13,	1963	Nicosia.
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should	supplement	their	current	policy	of	counseling	moderation	but	with	more	
positive	action,	notifying	that	“any	direct	US	approach	to	the	factions	in	Cyprus	
would	be	counterproductive	and	would	saddle	us	with	problem	for	indefinite	
future”32.	Despite	all	the	developments	and	the	negotiations	in	Cyprus,	the	US	
government	believed	that	it	was	not	the	time	for	them	to	push	Turks	on	Cyprus	
issue.	 Similarly	 Turkish	 Foreign	Minister	 Erkin’s	 attempt	 to	make	 a	meeting	
with	 Averoff	 	 in	 Istanbul	 or	 Alexandropolis	 in	 context	 of	 “gentleman’s	
agreement”	was	refused	by	Averoff	declaring	that	he	knew	of	no	such	agreement	
and	never	 replied	 to	Erkin’s	proposal33.	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	ambassador’s	
concern	 in	 Turkey	 was	 worth	 paying	 attention,	 asking	 “Was	 Makarios	
deliberately	 trying	 to	drive	 the	problem	 to	point	 of	desperation	which	 could	
lead	to	use	of	force?	It	seemed	fantastic	but	what	are	Turks	to	think?”34	Meanwhile	
Makarios’	speech	on	March	31	commemorating	the	1954	uprising	against	British	
colonial	rule	and	suggesting	his	commitment	to	eventual	Enosis	caused	Turkish	
reactions	 in	 Ankara,	 and	 the	 US	 ambassador	 in	 Ankara	 mentioned	 about	 a	
possible	 Turkish	 intervention	 in	 Cyprus.	 Moreover	 the	 US	 government	 too	
agreed	that	Makarios’	statements	were	unhelpful	 in	both	content	and	timing.	
According	to	the	US	ambassador	in	Nicosia,	“Makarios’	long-term	objective	is	
not	union	with	Greece	but	rather	elimination	or	neutralization	of	the	provisions	
in	London	and	Zurich	agreements	and	constitution	which	in	effect	circumscribe	
sovereignty	of	republic”35.	Just	one	day	later,	a	letter	written	by	the	American	
ambassador	 to	 Greece	 to	 Secretary	 of	 State	 was	 received	 with	 disturbing	
32	 For	 the	Americans,	 “in	 past	 few	days	 British	 have	 demonstrated	willingness	 to	 involve	
themselves	more	deeply	in	question	by	approaches	to	Turks	in	London	and	Ankara	and	to	
factions	in	Nicosia.	However	the	indications	are	that	their	approach	is	too	piecemeal	and	is	
not	having	desired	effect.”	Telegram	from	the	DOS	to	the	Embassy	in	the	UK;DOS,	CF,	POL	
18	Cyp.	Confidential,	February	16,	1963	Washington	DC.
33	 Telegram	 from	 the	Embassy	 in	 the	UK	 to	 the	DOS;	DOS,	CF,	POL	18	Cyp.Confidential,	
February	23,	1963	Nicosia.
34	 Turkish	Foreign	Minister	Erkin,	according	to	the	ambassador,	made	a	serious	but	emotional	
speech,	asking	for	only	the	respect	for	the	agreements	signed	in	1959.	Erkin	also	pointed	
out	that	Greek	journals	had	bitter	anti-Turk	campaigns	now	in	contrast	to	the	calm	news	in	
Turkish	journals.	Telegram	from	the	Embassy	in	Turkey	to	the	DOS;DOS,	CF,	POL	18	Cyp.	
Confidential,	April	1,	1963	Ankara.
35	 For	Americans,	Makarios	appears	very	confident	that	he	can	always	refer	the	issue	to	the	
UN	and	receive	wide	support	uncommitted	and	neutralist	nations	in	his	struggle	against	
Turkish	intervention,	and	Makarios	thinks	that	even	the	referral	to	the	UN,	or	the	threat	to	do	
so	would	impel	the	UK	and	the	USA	exert	pressure	on	Turkey	to	be	“reasonable”	of	course	
not	to	think	of	a	military	intervention	in	Cyprus.	The	US	point	of	view	is	that	Makarios	is	
“mistaken	in	his	belief,	but	perhaps	present	sensitive	period	is	not	appropriate	time	to	make	
point.”	What	Makarios	 tries	 to	do	 is	 clearly	 realized	by	Turkish	Cypriots	 and	Rauf	Raif	
Denktaş	writes	a	letter	to	the	President	of	the	Security	Council	of	the	UN,	saying	“Greek	
Cypriot	insistence	on	recognition	of	the	integrity	and	sovereignty	of	Cyprus	by	the	Security	
Council	is	a	trick	for	finding	the	untenable	excuse	to	argue	that	the	Treaty	of	Guaranteee	
is	non-effective	with	the	intention	of	getting	a	free	license	to	continue	the	massacre	of	the	
Turks	under	the	umbrella	of	the	United	Nations…”	Michael	Moran,	Sovereignty	Divided,	
Cyrep	Publications,	Nicosia,	1999,	p.	4.	See	also	Telegram	from	the	DOS	to	the	Embassy	in	
Cyprus;DOS,	CF,	POL	18	Cyp.	Confidential,	April	4,	1963	Washington	DC.
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information	 to	 inform	 the	 organization	 of	 a	 possible	 coup	 d’état	 against	 the	
Greek	government,	and	the	decision	of	a	coup	d’état	has	already	been	taken,	and	
it	 is	 no	 longer	 a	 question	 of	whether,	 but	when36.	 Thus	 the	US	 involves	 in	 a	
sophisticated	problem	in	Athens	too	apart	from	the	one	in	Cyprus.	5	days	later,	
on	the	other	hand,	American	ambassador	in	Greece	wrote	a	report	to	the	USA	
declaring	that	“Greece	is	prepared	to	continue	to	help	Cyprus	to	reach	reasonable	
solution,	 as	 in	 the	 past,	 but	 if	 Makarios	 should	 seek	 to	 force	 revision	 of	
constitution,	Greece	and	Cyprus	must	then	go	separate	ways.	Greece	has	always	
honored	 its	 signature	 and	will	 continue	 to	do	 so…”37	According	 to	Mr.	Fazıl	
Küçük	on	the	other	hand,	the	present	problem	about	the	municipality	started	
out	 as	 of	 minor	 importance	 and	 “has	 been	 blown	 up	 to	 unreasonable	
proportions”38.	 In	 contrast	 to	 Küçük’s	 evaluations	 upon	 the	 issue,	 Makarios	
himself	had	also	pessimism	over	the	possibility	of	a	compromise	solution	to	the	
municipalities	 issue	 as	 he	 desired39,	 frightening	 and	 surprising	 the	 US	 that	
Makarios’	attempts	were	regarded	as	dangerously	erroneous	to	cause	difficult	
judgments	and	choices	on	the	US	and	the	UK	as	well	as	Greece	and	Turkey40. 
Meanwhile	any	outer	interference	by	the	guarantor	states	in	internal	affairs	of	
36	 Additionally	the	US	regards	this	“disturbing	solution	as	a	blemish	on	Greece’s	good	name	
particularly	in	the	USA.”	And	“the	use	of	US	equipment	to	achieve	such	a	‘solution”	would	
be	regarded	with	grave	misgiving	and	disappointment	by	the	US.”	The	US	policy	upon	this	
situation	was	that	the	organization	“would	be	advised	in	emphatic	terms	of	the	damage	to	
Greece’s	international	reputation,	the	blow	to	NATO	confidence	in	Greece.”	Telegram	from	
the	Embassy	in	Greece	to	Secretary	of	State,	DOS,	CF,	POL	18	Cyp.	Secret,	April	27,	1963.
37	 	According	to	the	US	Embassy	in	Athens,	“Averoff,	similarly,	believes	his	letter	has	made	
deep	impression	on	Makarios	who	‘turned	white’	when	he	read	it.	It	is	Averoff’s	opinion	
that	Makarios	had	every	reason	to	believe	Greeks	are	not	speaking	idly	and	that	Makarios	
will	 realize	Government	of	Greece	 is	deadly	serious.”,	and	 this	 letter	was	considered	by	
the	DOS		as	a	“conscientious	and	serious	effort”	to	bring	Makarios	 into	 line,	undertaken	
political	risks.	DOS	also	announced	that	“Athens’	letter	to	Makarios	appears	to	be	mature	
statesmanlike	declaration	Government	of	Greece’s	respect	for	rule	of	law	and	demonstration	
its	determination	to	do	all	possible,	even	at	risk	being	attacked	by	political	opposition,	to	
persuade	 and	 pressure	 Archbishop	Makarios	 into	 adopting	 similar	 responsible	 outlook	
and	to	minimize	Cyprus	as	bone	of	contention	with	Turkey…”	Two	days	later,	American	
ambassador	in	Nicosia	visited	Makarios	and	emphasized	to	him	that	“Constitutional	Court	
handed	down	its	judgments,	and	there	was	new	opportunity	to	solve	this	issue	for	political	
and	 economic	 benefits	 of	Cyprus”	 and	 their	 continued	 belief	 in	 validity	 of	 London	 and	
Zurich	agreements.	Telegram	from	the	Embassy	in	Cyprus	to	the	DOS;	DOS,	CF,	POL	18	
Cyp.	Confidential,	April	30,	1963	Nicosia.	See	also	Letter	from	the	Ambassador	to	Greece	to	
Secretary	of	State,	DOS,	Greek	Desk	Files;	Lot	66	D	232,	Athens,	To	Secret,	April	5	and	22,	
1963.
38	 	Telegram	from	the	Embassy	in	Cyprus	to	the	DOS;	DOS,	CF,	POL	18	Cyp.	Confidential,	
April	30,	1963	Nicosia.
39	 	Telegram	from	the	DOS	to	the	Embassy	in	Cyprus;	DOS,	CF,	POL	18	Cyp.	Confidential,	
May	23,	1963	Washington	DC.
40	 Here	the	US	has	some	hesitation	that	Makarios	may	have	been	throwing	out	the	idea	of	his	
possible	appeal	to	the	UN	so	as	to	test	the	US	reaction	before	attempting	further	with	the	
plans	upon	the	issue.	That	means	not	only	Makarios	himself	but	also	the	US	is	also	very	
confused	 and	don’t	 know	what	 to	do	 and	how	 to	do	 before	monitoring	 and	 evaluating	
Makarios’	steps.	Telegram	from	the	DOS	to	the	Embassy	in	Cyprus;	DOS,	CF,	POL	18	Cyp.	
Confidential,	May	23,	1963	Washington	DC.
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Cyprus	 was	 thoroughly	 unacceptable	 for	 the	 US,	 and	 they	 declared	 it	 very	
frankly.	 June-July	 1963	 period	 was	 full	 of	 complicated	 and	 sophisticated	
happenings	 not	 only	 in	 Greece	 but	 also	 in	 Cyprus	 and	 Makarios	 was	 torn	
between	the	choices	which	he	was	unable	to	spot	the	right	and	the	correct	one,	
applying	 “the	 restatements	 of	 extreme	Greek	Cypriot	 revisionist	 demands”41 
Makarios	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 continued	 to	 provoke	 the	 Turkish	 Cypriots,	
forgetting	and	ignoring	their	political	and	sovereign	equality	as	well	as	the	US,	
the	 UK,	 and	 Turkey,	 making	 a	 speech	 on	 the	 withdrawal	 of	 the	 Treaty	 of	
Guarantee.	 It	 was	 a	 clear	 and	 frank	 indication	 that	 Makarios	 tried	 to	 make	
mostly	use	of	all	the	advantages	he	has	had	as	Archbishop	and	as	the	President,	
but	 the	 society	 around	 was	 sick	 and	 tired	 of	 his	 threats	 and	 challenging	
explanations	deriving	Cyprus	into	a	bloody	hell	in	the	following	days.	The	US,	
apart	from	Makarios’	clandestine	and	open	activities,	dealt	with	the	problems	in	
Greece	 as	well,	 regarding	 the	 feasible	 and	proper	 level	 of	 the	Greek	defense	
effort	due	to	the	probable	availability	of	Greek	resources	and	NATO	assistance	
and	 of	 the	 competing	 needs	 of	 the	 growing	 Greek	 economy42.	 Greek	 Prime	
Minister	 Pipinelis	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 tried	 to	 solve	 some	 seen	 and	 unseen	
problems	with	 Turkey	 and	 recently	 he	 sent	 a	 proposal	 to	 Turkey	 for	 a	 joint	
consortium	about	the	fishing	right	in	the	Aegean	Sea,	territorial	waters,,	and	the	
continental	shelf	there,	wishing	“This	would	leave	plenty	of	time	for	Greece	and	
Turkey	 to	work	out	 their	mutual	problems”43.	 	Having	 turned	back	 from	 the	
USA	trip,	Makarios	seemed	to	be	relaxed	and	confident	in	himself	saying	that	
Turkish	Cypriots	and	Turkey	would	sooner	or	later	see	merit	in	his	suggestions	
for	the	amendments,	suppressing	quickly	and	forcefully	any	opposition44	and	
the	objections	by	the	Turkish	Cypriots,	and	would	accept	them	even	if	he	might	
be,	 as	 stated	 by	 himself,	 forced	 to	 take	 unilateral	 action.	 Years	 later,	 what	
Archbishop	Makarios’	attempts	deriving	Cyprus	into	a	bloody	spot	was	named	
not	history	but	“hysteria”45.	For	the	US	party,	Makarios	was	on	the	wrong	track	
in	dealing	with	the	problem,	and	with	sincere	and	respectful	effort,	it	would	be	
better	and	wiser	to	make	some	arrangements	and	negotiations	behind	the	scenes	
with	Turkish	Cypriots.	
Out	of	Cyprus	issue,	the	USA	also	has	dealt	with	the	happenings	in	Greece	
as	well	and	in	addition	to	the	coup	d’état	action,	Greek	military	expenditures	
and	Greek	pressure	to	reimburse	it	have	annoyed	Washington	DC	a	lot.	On	June	
3,	1963,	the	US	President	for	example	warned	in	a	little	bit	rude	way	that	they	
41	 Telegram	from	the	Embassy	 in	Cyprus	 to	 the	DOS;	DOS,	CF,	POL	18	Cyp.	Confidential,	
June	27,	1963	Nicosia.
42	 Memorandum	 of	 Conversation;DOS,	 CF,	 POL	 US-Gr.Confidential,	 August	 7,	 1963	
Washington	DC.
43	 Greek	optimism	here	as	stated	by	the	US	ambassador	in	Athens	got	the	same	reflection	from	
Turkish	party	just	a	few	days	later.	Telegram	from	the	Embassy	in	Greece	to	the	DOS;	DOS,	
CF,	POL	15-5	Cyp,	Secret,	August	16,	1963	Athens.
44	 Clement	Dodd,	Ibid,	p.	13.
45	 John	Reddaway,	Ibid,	p.125.
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didn’t	want	to	push	Greek	military	expenditures	to	the	point	where	it	took	away	
from	economic	development,	and	“the	threat	was	always	there	(in	the	Balkans,	
in	particular	 in	Greece)	but	no	anticipation	about	any	major	attack	on	Greece	
or	generally46.	That	means	the	USA	was	actually	fed	up	with	Greek	bluffs	and	
the	tricky	diplomacy	to	supply	financial	and	military	aid	from	themselves,	and	
demanded	 that	Greece	concentrate	on	 the	 internal	growth	out	of	 the	military	
threats	 around	 if	 existing.	 Five	 days	 later	 Greece	 came	 into	 another	 chaotic	
atmosphere	since	Prime	Minister	Karamanlis	resigned,	following	a	disagreement	
with	the	Royal	family.		Currently	the	US	ambassador	in	Nicosia	made	a	grand	
pressure	upon	Makarios	notifying	that	economic	progress	which	Cyprus	was	
making	 didn’t	 parallel	 with	 the	 political	 progress,	 and	 Makarios	 defended	
himself	 that	he	was	preoccupied	with	other	questions	and	there	had	been	no	
new	political	developments	recently47.	Makarios	also	declared	that	Republic	of	
Cyprus	was	not	a	free	country	and	London	and	Zurich	agreements	didn’t	give	
such	a	right	to	the	guarantor	countries	to	interfere	with	the	island,	and	for	him,	if	
the	other	parties	had	such	a	right	of	intervention	and	had	their	military	personnel	
situated	on	the	island	as	Greece	and	Turkey	did	in	1960,	Cyprus	could	never	be	
described	as	an	independent	country.	In	this	point	Makarios	seemed	to	forget	or	
behaved	as	if	he	forgot	the	British	sovereign	bases	in	Cyprus,	regarding	them	as	
different	matters	as	they	were	the	subject	of	separate	bilateral	agreements.	Once	
more	he	has	had	a	great	concern	and	politeness	not	to	disturb	and	annoy	British	
government	 here	 as	 a	 step	 life	 preserver.	 The	 efforts	 created	 by	Makarios	 to	
change	the	constitutional	structure	and	his	way	of	talks	resulted	a	British	note	of	
protest,	with	the	aim	of	the	minimum	harm	to	British	relations	with	the	Cyprus	
government48.	Similarly	Makarios’	way	of	talking	and	his	manners	completely	
disappointed	the	US	ambassador	in	Nicosia,	and	the	ambassador	replied	him	
that	he	had	talked	to	a	good	many	Turkish	Cypriot	leaders	so	that	they	could	
start	once	more	the	earlier	talks	and	the	negotiations	unlike	Makarios’	opinion	
that	it	would	be	fruitless	and	useless	to	have	direct	talks	with	Turkish	Cypriots.	
Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	ambassador	pressed	Makarios	very	hard	to	continue	
the	direct	talks	with	Turkish	Cypriots,	Makarios	frustrated	everybody	around	
considering	 different	 ways	 of	 solution	 such	 as	 reference	 to	 the	 UN	 and	 to	
46	 	Greek	Minister	of	Coordination;	Papaligouras	on	the	other	hand,	showed	their	will	about	
the	 possibility	 of	 a	US	participation	 in	 the	 form	of	 a	 grant	 in	 the	NATO	Greek	defense	
exercise	 in	 1964.	What	Greece	wanted	 to	do	was	 in	 fact	 to	 see	 the	USA	 in	 collaboration	
with	 Greece,	 especially	 as	 a	 military	 partner	 against	 the	 “neighbors”	 and	 the	 threats.	
Memorandum	of	Conversation;	DOS,	CF,	POL	Gr-US.	Secret,	June	3,	1963	Washington	DC.	
See	also	Memorandum	of	Conversation;	DOS,	Secretary’s	Memoranda	of	Conversation;	Lot	
65	D	330.	Confidential,	June	6,	1963	Washington	DC.
47	 	Unfortunately	Makarios	was	as	obstinate	as	a	rock	and	was	determined	to	realize	what	he	
planned	before,	declaring	that	it	would	be	necessary	to	revise	Cyprus	Constitution.	Doing	
so,	he	would	grasp	all	the	rights	of	the	citizenship,	equality	of	Turkish	community,	safety,	
and	 the	guarantee	 to	 live	on	 the	 island	 in	 a	 secure	way.	Telegram	 from	 the	Embassy	 in	
Cyprus	to	the	DOS;	DOS,	CF,	POL	1	Cyp.	Confidential,	June	6,	1963,	Washington	DC.
48	 	Ahmet	C.	Gazioğlu	and	Michael	Moran,	Past-Masters	of	Illegality,	Cyrep	2000,	Nicosia,	p.	
13-14.
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guarantor	states.	Out	of	Cyprus,	Greek	government	regarded	itself	as	an	interim	
government	and	the	situation	in	Greece	seemed	to	be	very	pessimistic	due	to	
the	internal	problems.	Such	a	situation	in	Greece	forced	the	USA	to	regard	the	
Balkans	once	more	and	the	question	“Is	there	anything	the	USA	could	or	should	
do	about	it?”49	came	to	the	surface	again.									
On	October	 1,	 1963,	 at	 the	 18th	 session	 of	 the	UN	General	Assembly,	
Cypriot	Permanent	representative	Rossides	in	reply	to	Turkish	Foreign	Minister	
Erkin	said	that	Makarios’	current	behaviors	and	the	actions	didn’t	mean	that	the	
constitutional	 guarantees	 of	 the	 Turkish	 Cypriots	 were	 in	 question.	 Turkish	
Foreign	 Affairs	 Minister	 also,	 in	 turn,	 demanded	 that	 the	 agreements	 be	
thoroughly	and	solemnly	be	implemented	as	signed	by	three	guarantor	states,	
recognizing	the	equal	existence	of	the	two	communities	on	the	island.	According	
to	 Turkish	 minister,	 the	 municipalities	 question	 was	 not	 that	 of	 perpetual	
partition	 of	 the	 municipalities	 but	 just	 a	 question	 of	 good	 will	 and	 mutual	
confidence	as	expressed	“the	sooner	the	Greek	Cypriot	leaders	are	able	to	create	
the	necessary	degree	of	inter-communal	confidence,	the	sooner	the	partition	of	
municipalities	 can	 be	 ended,	 at	 which	 point	 no	 one	 could	 be	 happier	 than	
Turkey”50.	While	Turkey	presenting	such	a	branch	of	tree	to	Greece,	Makarios	
who	 had	 never	 been	 affected	 and	 influenced	 by	 anybody	 except	 for	Glafgos	
Clerides	a	little	appeared	again	on	the	stage,	and	it	was	clear	that	no	individual	
possessed	 any	 influence	 over	 Makarios	 striking	 a	 match	 over	 Cyprus	 and	
endangering	all	the	communities	there.	The	weather	over	Cyprus	seemed	to	be	
very	gloomy	and	the	atmosphere	was	uncertain	for	all	the	parties	involved,	and	
Makarios	once	more	wanted	the	US	to	participate	 in	the	 issue	by	October	28,	
1963	to	present	the	recommendations	on	what	measures	might	be	taken	so	as	to	
finish	the	dangerous	issue.	On	the	other	hand,	Turkey	paid	a	great	importance	
to	 US	 role	 in	 Cyprus	 in	 influencing	 the	 communities	 on	 the	 island	 and	 the	
guarantor	states,	meanwhile	the	US	embassy	in	Turkey	is	at	nerve,	regarding	
“Turkish	popular	reaction	to	any	change	affecting	Turkish	minority	in	a	volcanic	
way”51.	 To	 do	 so,	 the	 US	 government	 prepared	 a	 detailed	 plan	 to	 lessen	
communal	 tensions	 and	 to	 enhance	 the	possibility	 for	 a	 settlement	 of	Greek-
49	 	This	is	also	just	a	dilemma	for	the	USA	and	they	feel	like	planning	the	following	strategic	
plans	very	cautiously,	refraining	themselves	from	such	unexpected	steps.	National	Security	
Action	Memorandum	No	251;	DOS,	S/S-NSC	Files;	Lot	72	D	316,	NSAM	251,	Secret,	July	8,	
1963	Washington	DC.
50	 	Mr.	Erkin	also	emphasized	that	Greece	has	several	times	attempted	with	little	success	to	
warn	Greek	Cypriot	leaders.	That’s	why	such	an	issue	increased	in	a	dangerous	and	tragic	
way	up	to	Bloody	Christmas	on	December	21,	1963,	and	Turkish	Peace	Operation	on	July	
20,	1974.	Erkin’s	suggestion	was	that	the	US	aid	to	Cyprus	be	withheld	so	as	to	pressure	
upon	Makarios	 into	 adopting	 a	more	 sensible	 and	 communal	 policy,	 emphasizing	 very	
carefully	that	he	had	never	mentioned	about	the	partition	of	the	island	as	a	solution	due	to	
the	hardships	and	the	difficulties	which	would	be	involved.	Memorandum	of	Conversation;	
DOS,	CF,	POL	Cyp.	Confidential,	October	1,	1963,	New	York.
51	 Telegram	from	the	Embassy	in	Turkey	to	the	DOS;	DOS,	CF,	POL	15-5	Cyp.	Confidential,	
October	20,	1963,	Ankara.
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Turkish	 differences	 through	 cooperation	 in	 Cyprus	 and	 its	 economic	
development.	 The	first	 priority	 for	 the	US	 seemed	 to	 urge	 the	UK	 to	 call	 on	
Greece	and	Turkey	 to	agree	on	a	 three-power	approach	 to	Makarios	and	Dr.	
Küçük	with	an	assurance	of	US	support,	and	the	necessity	of	the	leaders	on	the	
island	 to	 reaffirm	 support	 of	 the	 London-Zurich	 agreement	 and	 the	 Cyprus	
Constitution,	some	amendments	subject	to	change	in	the	agreements	signed	in	
1959	if	necessary.	The	principal	changes	presented	and	demanded	by	Makarios	
are	 the	 unification	 of	municipalities	within	 definite	 time	 period,	 no	 separate	
majorities	for	tax	measures,	small	army	or	none	at	all,	civil	service	employment	
on	more	rational	basis,	elimination	of	Vice	President’s	veto	powers,	consolidation	
of	judicial	system,	and	elimination	of	communal	chambers.	Similarly	Makarios	
also	desired	to	abolish	and	cancel	Treaties	of	Guarantee	and	Alliance	signed	by	
the	involved	states.	On	November	11,	1963,	another	gentle	and	logical	statement	
came	from	Mr.	Erkin	to	the	British	Foreign	Affairs	Minister	that	the	Cyprus	issue	
had	 escalated	 from	 a	 simple	 question	 of	 municipal	 to	 a	 broad	 attack	 on	
Constitution,	not	only	because	of	Makarios	but	also	by	Clerides.	Similarly	Dr.	
Küçük	whose	veto	powers	wanted	to	be	eliminated	by	Makarios	stated	that	he	
was	ready	to	negotiate	Greek	Cypriot	proposals	for	institutional	change	but	he	
would	reject	any	document	presenting	them	as	amendments	to	the	constitution	
of	Cyprus.	On	November	25-26,	1963,	Queen	Frederika	of	Greece,	and	Sophocles	
Venizelos;	 Deputy	 Prime	 Minister	 and	 Foreign	 Minister	 of	 Greece	 were	 in	
Washington	 DC,	 the	 USA,	 and	 come	 together	 with	 the	 newly-appointed	
President	Lyndon	Baiden	Johnson52.	Venizelos	expressed	the	deep	grief	of	the	
Greek	people	for	the	assassination	of	the	late	John	F.	Kennedy	on	November	22,	
1963	in	Dallas,	and	expressing	that	his	party	for	11	years	had	been	in	opposition	
before	 forming	 the	present	government.	Venizelos	also	expressed	 that	all	 the	
members	of	the	new	cabinet	in	Athens	were	pro-West	and	great	friends	of	the	
USA53.	On	the	other	hand,	the	only	external	question	on	which	the	newly-elected	
government	 would	 differ	 with	 the	 previous	 Caramanlis	 government	 was	
Cyprus.	According	to	Venizelos,	as	Makarios	also	requested	and	demanded,	so	
as	 to	 live	 on	 the	 island,	 it	 would	 be	 essential	 to	make	 some	 changes	 in	 the	
constitution54.	Venizelos	was	very	glad	that	the	British	government	understood	
well	what	they	wanted	on	the	island.	Venizelos	also	called	on	Prime	Minister	
Ismet	Inonu	and	Foreign	Affairs	Minister	to	meet	at	the	following	NATO	submit	
in	 addition	 to	 the	 guarantor	 states’	meeting	 to	 be	 held	 in	 Paris	 to	 negotiate	
Cyprus	issue.		For	Venizelos	as	he	expressed	to	the	American	officials,	“the	great	
52	 DOS,	Secretary’s	Memoranda	of	Conversation;	Lot	65	D	330.	Confidential,	November	26,	
1963	Washington	DC.
53	 By	the	way	Venizelos	also	added	that	government	of	Cyprus,	that	is	to	say,	Makarios	and	
his	staff,	had	British	support,	and	he	demanded	that	the	USA	contribute	finding	solution	
as	Makarios	wanted	to	make	amendments	without	Turkish	Cypriot	agreement.	Telegram	
from	the	DOS	to	the	Embassy	in	Cyprus;	DOS,	CF,	POL	15-5	Cyp.	Confidential,	November	
27,	1963	Washington	DC.
54	 DOS,	Secretary’s	Memoranda	of	Conversation;	Lot	65	D	330.	Confidential,	November	26,	
1963	Washington	DC.
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concern	would	be	 to	eliminate	 from	the	Cyprus	Constitution	 those	parts	 that	
caused	great	 friction	 between	 the	 communities	 in	Cyprus,	 and	 thus	 between	
Greece	and	Turkey”55.	What	he	also	added	on	Cyprus	“This	had	nothing	to	do	
with	any	step	towards	Enosis.”	also	showed	that	Venizelos	knew	almost	nothing	
about	Turkish	Cypriots	and	about	their	demands.	According	to	Venizelos,	the	
only	purpose	here	was	to	eliminate	the	dangerous	frictions	and	the	controversies,	
and	contrary	 to	 the	 stories	of	desire	 to	prepare	 the	 island	 for	 the	union	with	
Greece,	the	offers	and	the	proposals	were	all	intended	to	make	the	island	more	
livable	for	the	people	there.	It	was	also	announced	there	by	Venizelos	that	his	
government	would	 be	 very	 glad	 and	 content	 to	 see	 not	 Cyprus	 as	 a	 part	 of	
Greece	but	a	second	Greece	 in	Cyprus.	Thus,	 it	 is	 frankly	realized	that	Greek	
government	has	no	objection	and	hesitation	on	Makarios’	activities	on	the	island,	
and	that	they	support	Makarios	blind-folded.	On	the	other	hand,	the	US	part	
seemed	to	behave	very	careful	and	neutral	on	the	topic	declaring	that	the	US	had	
no	specific	formula	to	suggest	for	Cyprus	and	their	great	interest	was	in	good	
relations	between	Turkey	and	Greece	in	a	stable	position	in	Cyprus.	Meanwhile	
a	memorandum	prepared	by	Makarios	was	delivered	 to	 the	 involved	parties	
including	 the	 US	 embassy	 in	 Nicosia,	 named	 “Suggested	 Measures	 for	
Facilitating	the	Smooth	Functioning	of	the	State	and	for	the	Removal	of	Certain	
Causes	 of	 Intercommunal	 Friction.”	 Dr.	 Küçük	 had	 almost	 no	 suitable	 and	
enough	time	to	read	the	memorandum	but	his	first	reaction	was	“very	bad”	as	
expressed	by	Spiros	Kyprianou56.	Interestingly,	the	US	embassy	in	Nicosia	stated	
that	Dr.	Küçük	accompanied	by	Cemal	Müftüzade	all	the	time	would	need	one	
more	week	to	read	and	to	study	the	memorandum,	discussing	it	with	no	Turkish	
Cypriots.	Due	to	the	delicacy	of	the	issue,	the	US	wanted	to	keep	in	touch	with	
the	Greek	government,	but	restraining	to	take	any	initiative	on	the	island.	For	
the	Greek	 delegation,	 the	 British	 party	 viewed	 the	 issue	with	 sympathy	 and	
understanding,	 and	 the	 USA	 government	 was	 also	 expected	 to	 do	 so.	 For	
Venizelos,	 Makarios	 was	 ready	 to	 make	 concessions	 beyond	 the	 Cyprus	
Constitution,	 and	 the	 vice-president	 (Dr.	 Fazıl	 Küçük)	 rather	 than	 the	Greek	
Speaker	of	 the	House	 should	act	 in	his	 stead	when	 the	President	was	absent	
from	the	country.	Greek	ignorance	upon	Turkish	existence,	and	constitutional	
rights	 on	 the	 island	was	 responded	by	 the	US	party	 that	 anything	would	be	
accomplished	by	negotiation	and	agreement.	A	few	days	later	it	was	clear	that	
Turkish	 government	 would	 declare	 Turkish	 decision	 rejecting	 the	 plan	
completely,	and	regarding	the	Cyprus	question	stiffening.	Turkish	position	was	
supposed	 to	 be	 very	disappointing	 for	 the	US	 since	 Foreign	Affairs	Minister	
Feridun	 Cemal	 Erkin’s	 former	 thought	 was	 “to	 study	 carefully	 and	 reply	
specifically”,	and	the	USA	had	seemed	such	a	behavior	wisest57.	The	atmosphere	
55	 DOS,	Secretary’s	Memoranda	of	Conversation;	Lot	65	D	330.	Confidential,	November	26,	
1963	Washington	DC.
56	 Telegram	from	the	Embassy	in	Cyprus	to	the	DOS;	DOS,		CF,	POL	15-5	Cyp.	Confidential,	
November	30,	1963	Washington	DC.
57	 Telegram	from	the	Embassy	in	Turkey	to	the	DOS;	DOS,	CF,	POL	15-5	Cyp.	Confidential,	
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in	Cyprus	was	very	dangerous	and	risky	and	the	negotiating	parties	have	started	
observing	the	danger	coming	closer,	and	the	US	gathered	an	urgent	meeting	in	
Washington	 DC,	 inviting	 Turkish	 Ambassador	 Turgut	 Menemencioğlu,	 and	
Counselor	 of	 Turkish	 Embassy	 İlter	 Türkmen.	Menemencioğlu	 there	made	 a	
talk	and	mentioned	on	the	current	situation	in	Cyprus	“by	tracing	recent	events	
revolving	 around	 the	 amendments	made	by	Makarios,	which	were	 regarded	
“negative,	unworkable	and	unjust”58	by	the	Greek	Cypriots,	and	he	tied	this	to	
the	Cyprus	crisis	of	the	1950’s	which	he	explained	in	terms	of	Greek	and	Turkish	
public	 opinion	 developing	 extreme	 opinions	 and	 dragging	 their	 respective	
government	 into	similar	positions”59,	 showing	that	Turkey	wanted	to	avoid	a	
repetition	of	 this	now	again	upon	the	heart	of	 life-and-death	issues	 involving	
Turkish	Cypriots60.	 	Makarios	was	mistaken	and	he	 failed	 to	understand	 that	
any	Turkish	government	would	have	clearly	the	same	reaction	and	the	objection	
as	the	Inonu	government	did61.	Turkish	Foreign	Minister	Feridun	Cemal	Erkin,	
on	 the	other	hand,	made	an	additional	 explanation	 in	Paris	on	December	15,	
1963	 that	 Makarios’	 proposals	 to	 amend	 Cyprus	 Constitution	 were	 highly	
unsatisfactory62.	Erkin	also	warned	that	if	Makarios	did	not	continue	to	respect	
Constitution,	 Turkey	might	 find	 it	 necessary	 to	 request	 guarantor	 powers	 to	
interfere	 with	 Cyprus,	 either	 individually	 or	 collectively.	 Unlike	 Venizelos’	
opinions,	Erkin	announced	that	Makarios’	proposals	were	designed	to	destroy	
Constitution	 and	 to	 make	 chaotic	 atmosphere	 in	 Cyprus.	 Even	 if	 the	 US	
government	seemed	and	tried	 to	be	neutral	on	Cyprus	 issue,	Erin	demanded	
that	the	USA	make	strong	representation	in	Cyprus	emphasizing	to	Makarios	
that	his	proposals	endangered	peace	on	the	island63.	The	response	once	more	to	
Erkin’s	demand	from	the	US	party	was	that	the	US	took	position	that	guarantor	
December	7,	1963	Ankara.
58	 Zenon	Stavrinides,	ibid,	p.4.
59	 Memorandum	 of	 Conversation;	 DOS,	 CF,	 POL	 Cyp.	 Confidential,	 December	 12,	 1963	
Washington	DC.
60	 One	 of	 the	 hesitation	 as	 well	 as	 the	 army	 and	 the	 police	 presented	 and	 restrained	 by	
Turkish	party	was	the	veto	power,	and	it	was	particularly	very	important	and	necessary	
“as	 a	 safeguard	 against	 communist	 strength	 in	 Cyprus,	 a	 subject	 which	 President	 John	
Fitzgerald	Kennedy	had	referred	to	in	his	conversation	with	Feridun	Cemal	Erkin.”	By	the	
way,	Kennedy,	and	Secretary	of	Department	Rusk,	Mr.	Erkin,	and	Menemencioğlu	came	
together	on	June	1,	1963	but	no	memorandum	of	this	above-mentioned	gathering	has	been	
found	there.	Memorandum	of	Conversation;	DOS,	CF,	POL	Cyp.	Confidential,	December	
12,	1963	Washington	DC.
61	 It	is	really	very	important	and	worth	mentioning	and	declining	that	Menemencioğlu	during	
this	meeting	pointed	out	an	important	aspect	saying	that	“there	are	no	real	Cypriots,	only	
Greek	Cypriots	 and	Turkish	Cypriots”,	 and	Turkish	 and	Greek	 government	would	 also	
speak	up	for	its	fellow	nationals.	Doing	so,	Menemencioğlu	has	made	some	reflections	and	
remembrance	not	only	for	the	day	at	the	time	being	but	also	for	the	day	we	are	living	now,	
especially	remembering	the	artifice	al	discussions	upon	“Kıbrıslı,	kıbrıslıtürk,	kıbrıslırum,	
etc.”
62	 Telegram	from	Secretary	of	State	to	the	DOS;	DOS,	CF,	POL	Tur.Secret;	Priority	December	
15,	1963	Paris.
63	 Telegram	from	Secretary	of	State	to	the	DOS;	DOS,	CF,	POL	Tur.Secret;	Priority	December	
15,	1963	Paris.
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states	were	the	ones	which	could	best	resolve	the	Cyprus	issue,	declaring	that	
“the	 US	 had	 already	 enough	 problems	 on	 its	 agenda	without	 taking	 on	 the	
Cyprus	dispute”64.	The	NATO	Ministerial	Meeting	held	in	London	on	December	
18-19	tuned	to	be	a	good	chance	and	opportunity	for	the	ministers	involved	to	
negotiate	 the	 issue	 in	detail.	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	proposals	made	 there	 to	
solve	the	issue	“once	and	for	all”	seemed	to	be	illogical	and	unacceptable	for	the	
Turkish	party65;
“To solve Cyprus problem once and for all, one of two possible alternatives 
indicated; 1) union with Greece or 2) independence within British Commonwealth 
cutting alliance with Greece and Turkey. Greek and Turkish alliances were merely 
sources of friction. Troops maintained in Cyprus cannot defend the country and can 
only turn possible internal conflicts into broader ones. Greek and Turkish forces should 
leave and UK (should) remain.” 
As	seen	and	expressed	clearly,	British	Foreign	Ministry	thought	that	only	
problem	here	was	Turkish	government,	Greeks	would	agree,	and	the	UK	was	
favorable.	Doing	so,	the	British	authorities	also	seemed	to	force	not	only	Turkish	
government	but	also	Turkish	Cypriots,	declaring	that	Turkish	Cypriots’	refusal	
of	the	amendments	and	the	negotiations	would	cause	dangerous	situations	as	in	
“speak softly and carry a big stick”66.
Bloody Christmas Butchery And Cyprus On December 1963
21st	 December	 1963	 is	 known	 and	 remembered	 throughout	 Cyprus	
history,	in	particular,	for	the	Turkish	Cypriots	as	the	Bloody	Christmas	or	the	
Black	Christmas.		It	is	Bloody	and	Black	Christmas	because	the	EOKA	gunmen	
have	attacked	on	a	small	Nicosia	district	where	the	İlhan	Family	has	lived	up	
to	21st	December	1963.	Dr.	Major	(then	Brigadier	General	in	Turkish	Army)	was	
assigned	a	mission	in	Turkish	Peace	Forces	Command	established	in	1960,	and	
started	serving	there	as	a	medical	military	personnel.	As	soon	as	the	Greek	Cypriot	
attacks	broke	out	in	Nicosia,	he	also	directly	went	to	the	HQ	until	December	28,	
1963.	When	he	turned	back	to	Nicosia	again,	what	he	found	and	witnessed	there	
was	a	tragedy	and	humanitarian	shame	caused	by	the	Greek	Cypriots.	Not	only	
Major	Nihat	İlhan’s	wife	Mürüvet,	his	3	children	Hakan,	Kutsi	and	Murat	but	
64	 Telegram	from	Secretary	of	State	to	the	DOS;	DOS,	CF,	POL	Tur.Secret;	Priority	December	
15,	1963	Paris.
65	 Telegram	from	Secretary	of	State	to	the	DOS;DOS,	CF,	POL	25	CYp.Confidential,	December	
18,	1963.	London
66	 This	is	a	very	unfortunate	situation	and	unlucky	declaration	made	by	British	Foreign	Minister	
that	“people	of	Cyprus”	should	decide	for	them,	and	now	that	82	%	of	the	population	is	
Greek	Cypriot,	 the	 issue	 should	 be	 solved	 and	 decided	 by	 “democratic	means.”	 British	
Minister	 frankly	 and	openly	 expresses	 that	 the	majority	 of	 the	population	on	 the	 island	
is	Greek	Cypriots	 so	 they	 themselves	 should	 decide	 upon	 the	 destiny	 of	 Cyprus,	 using	
“democratic	methods”	as	done	in	1950’s	in	the	plebiscite	of	which	the	result	was	known	in	
the	very	beginning.	
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also	the	wife	of	the	landlord	Hasan	Yusuf	Gudum;	Feride	were	shot	to	death	
wildly	and	Hasan	Yusuf	Gudum,	his	nephew	Ayşe,	Növber	and	her	2	year-old	
daughter	 Işın	were	seriously	wounded	as	expressed	by	Le	Figaro	on	 January	
25,	1964	as	expressed	in	the	journal	below;	“I	have	seen	in	a	bathtub	the	bodies	
of	a	mother	and	of	her	three	young	children	murdered	just	because	their	father	
was	a	Turkish	officer.”	The	photograph	showing	the	mother	and	three	innocent	
sons	killed	in	the	bath	turned	to	be	the	symbol	of	the	Greek	Cypriot	brutality	
then.	 According	 to	 the	 report	 announced	 by	 Secretary	 General	 of	 the	 UN	
dated	September	10,	1964,	109	evacuated	Turkish	villages	were	damaged	with	
507	Turkish	houses,	more	than	2000	houses	were	seriously	demolished,	some	
25.000	Turkish	Cypriots	were	 turned	 to	be	 refugees	 in	addition	 to	 the	 loss	of	
agricultural,	economic,	social,	educational	aspects67.	Then	one	day	later,	British	
High	Commissioner	had	separate	talks	with	Makarios	and	Dr.	Küçük	upon	the	
recent	happenings	especially	in	Nicosia,	and	the	Department	of	State	informed	
British	Embassy	there	about	the	desire	for	a	joint	representation	of	Greek	and	
Turkish	Cypriot	 leaders	 around	 a	 circle	 table	“with the aim of restraining both 
the police and Turkish rioters in the aftermath of violent clashes”68 	 between	 the	
communities	resulting	five	deaths	at	once.	According	to	Dr.	Küçük	who	was	very	
pessimistic	after	such	atrocity	in	Nicosia,	describing	the	events	as	a	new	step	for	
the	Greek	Cypriots	 to	 change	 the	 constitution	and	 the	 treaties	 explained	 that	
Greek	Cypriot	police	for	a	while	had	been	harassing	Turkish	Cypriots	at	night	
and	Policarpos	Yeorgadjis	in	charge	of	the	İnterior	Ministry	had	been	irresolute	
and	biased	in	his	reporting	to	Archbishop	Makarios,	and	in	handling	the	events.	
Dr.	Küçük	also	suggested	that	a	quick	commission	of	inquiry	be	planned,	and	a	
joint	visit	to	the	scene	of	altercation	be	realized	at	once.	Moderation	and	restraint	
were	Dr.	Küçük’s	key	points	but	he	didn’t	know	how	long	he	could	control	his	
own	community	in	face	of	such	continual	Greek	Cypriot	provocation.	Yeorgadjis	
was	also	demanded	that	the	Greek	Cypriot	police	force	be	kept	out	of	Turkish	
vicinity,	 and	out	of	provocative	manners	 against	 the	Turkish	 community.	By	
the	way	Makarios	also	accepted	Dr.	Küçük’s	offer	to	set	a	joint	commission	of	
inquiry,	hoping	that	the	measures	taken	in	Cyprus	would	be	helpful	in	bringing	
down	tension	and	restoring	peace,	and	adding	that	he	would	not	move	forward	
as	 quickly	 with	 his	 plans	 for	 the	 constitutional	 changes.	 Meanwhile	 Greek	
government	unfortunately	gives	a	great	amount	of	assistance	and	support	to	the	
Greek	Cypriot	“genocidal	activities”69	and	deploying	clandestinely	more	than	
20.000	soldiers	and	the	ammunitions	to	the	island.	Thus	the	events	finally	shown	
that	Greek	Cypriots	under	the	command	of	Policarpos	Yeorgadjis		established	
a	para-military	organization	starting	from	1960,	and	 in	addition	to	 the	efforts	
to	change	the	constitution	they	sparked	off	December	crisis	and	collapsed	the	
67	 Haluk	Bayülken,	Cyprus	Question	and	the	United	Nations,	Ankara,	July	1983,	28.
68	 Telegram	 from	 the	Embassy	 in	Cyprus	 to	 the	DOS;DOS,	CF,	POL	25	Cyp.	Confidential,	
December	22,	1963	Nicosia.
69	 Fatma	 Demirel,	 Never	 Again,	 TRNC	 Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 and	 Defence;Public	
Relations	Department,	Nicosia,	p.6.
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republic	 in	 this	way70.	On	December	 23,	 1963,	 the	US	 ambassador	 in	Ankara	
was	asked	to	visit	Turkish	Foreign	Minister	Erkin,	and	Erkin	told	him	that	he	
had	made	very	 fruitful	 negotiations	with	Venizelos	 in	Paris	 on	December	 20	
just	 one	 day	 before	 the	Greek	Cypriot	 attacks	 against	 Turkish	Cypriots,	 and	
they	had	come	to	an	agreement	that	mutual	effort	should	be	made	to	solve	the	
problems	about	the	constitutional	changes	in	Cyprus.	Nevertheless	as	soon	as	
he	turned	back	to	Ankara,	he	learned	of	serious	disorders	and	the	Greek	Cypriot	
attacks	killing	some	innocent	people	in	Nicosia.	Then	Prime	Minister	in	Ankara	
demanded	that	the	attacks	on	Turkish	Cypriots	cease	at	once	and	Makarios	be	
held	responsible	 for	 the	violence	caused	by	 the	ex-EOKA	militias71.	 It	 is	once	
more	worth	underlining	here	that	the	US	didn’t	believe	the	hostilities	occurred	
in	 Cyprus	 were	 not	 planned	 by	 either	 side,	 declaring	 “…that	 leadership	 of	
both	 communities	 making	 genuine	 effort	 to	 halt	 fighting,	 and	 that	 armed	
underground	organizations	in	both	communities	are	out	of	control.	Extremists	
on	both	sides	accuse	leadership	of	other	side	of	plotting	attacks”72.	Meanwhile	
Turkish	ambassador	 in	Washington	DC	described	 the	worsening	 situation	 in	
Cyprus,	emphasizing	alleged	merger	of	police	units	with	EOKA	and	attacks	on	
Turkish	Cypriot	women	and	children73.	Then	Turkish	ambassador	warned	the	
US	authorities	in	Washington	DC	that	Turkish	armed	forces	would	act	with	or	
without	civilian	government	in	Cyprus.	That	meant	Turkish	military	existence	
in	Cyprus	which	was	located	after	the	foundation	of	Republic	of	Cyprus	with	
650	military	personnel	or	Turkish	army	from	Turkey	would	push	the	button	to	
make	 an	 operation	 on	 the	 island.	 Successively	Turkish	NATO	 representative	
on	December	25,	1963	made	a	 long	speech	paying	attention	 to	especially	 two	
important	points	of	Turkish	community	in	danger	of	massacre	by	Greek	Cypriots	
and	 of	 the	 intention	 of	 Turkish	 government	 to	 act	 unilaterally	 by	 deploying	
Turkish	army	to	Cyprus	if	tripartite	action	by	guarantor	states	proved	unable	to	
control	the	situation	there74.	Surprisingly	once	more	the	UK	called	Turkish	and	
Greek	ambassadors	in	London	and	proposed	them	a	joint	military	intervention	
in	Cyprus	immediately	and	the	military	intervention	would	be	under	the	control	
of	British	command,	and	at	first	would	be	very	limited	and	confined	to	military	
units75.	 That	 offered	 seemed	 to	be	baloney	 and	not	 accepted	by	 the	 involved	
parties	at	all.	Makarios’	and	his	government’s	request	for	a	UN	Security	Council	
70	 Zaim	M.	Necatigil,	The	Cyprus	Question	and	 the	Turkish	Position	 in	 International	Law,	
Oxford	Press	Publications,	Essex,	1999,	p.	25.
71	 Telegram	from	the	DOS	to	the	Embassy	in	Turkey;	DOS,	CF,	POL	25	Cyp.	Secret,	December	
24,	1963	Washington	DC.
72	 Telegram	from	the	DOS	to	the	Embassy	in	Turkey;	DOS,	CF,	POL	25	Cyp.	Secret,	December	
24,	1963	Washington	DC.
73	 Telegram	from	the	DOS	to	 the	Embassy	 in	Cyprus;	DOS,	CF,	POL	25	Cyp.	Confidential,	
December	24,	1963	Washington	DC.
74	 Telegram	from	the	DOS	to	 the	Embassy	 in	Cyprus;	DOS,	CF,	POL	25	Cyp.	Confidential,	
December	25,	1963	Washington	DC
75	 Telegram	from	the	Mission	to	the	NATO	and	European	Regional	Organizations	to	the	DOS;	
DOS,	CF,	POL	25	Cyp/NATO.	Secret,		December	25,	1963	Paris
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meeting	about	the	future	of	the	island	caused	serious	reactions	in	Ankara	and	
Turkish	 government	 declared	 that	 Makarios’	 first	 and	 real	 purpose	 was	 to	
make	 life	so	unbearable	on	 the	 island	for	Turks	 that	 they	would	be	 forced	 to	
leave	Cyprus	 so	 as	 to	make	Cyprus	 a	Greek	 island	 for	Greece.	On	 the	 other	
hand	 the	US	embassy	 thought	 that	Turkish	Cypriots	would	accept	and	settle	
for	 autonomy	with	more	 effective	guarantees	 such	as	 larger	Turkish	military	
contingent	in	Cyprus.		
Conclusion
Because	 all	 the	Greek	 efforts	 to	make	 the	 island	 a	Greek	one	 starting	
from	mainly	1950s	came	to	an	end	with	failure	in	the	United	Nations	Security	
Council,	and	the	result	of	the	plebicite	was	also	invalid	to	accept	the	island	as	
a	Greek	one,	Greece	had	only	one	 solution	 for	 themselves,	 that	 is	 the	 armed	
struggle	against	Turkish	Cypriots.	Then	what	we	came	face	to	face	on	the	island	
was	 the	 EOKA	 terrorist	 organizaton	 turning	 the	 island	 into	 a	 bloody	 lake.	
Thus	1955-1960	period	was	full	of	a	good	many	atrocities,	imprisonment	of	the	
Turkish	Cypriots,	embargo	and	the	restriction	adopted	upon	Turkish	Cypriots,	
immigration	and	runaway	from	teh	risky	villages	to	the	relatively	secure	parts	
of	 the	 island,	 loss	of	 innocent	 lives,	 tears,	 and	 the	 innocent	blood.	Under	 the	
guarantee	of	the	United	Kingdom,	Turkey	and	Greece,	the	bloody	spot	position	
of	the	island	got	wanted	to	be	changed	and	on	August	16,	1960,	the	Republic	
of	Cyprus	was	declared	 to	 the	 international	 public	 but	 unfortunately	 even	 if	
the	Republic	of	Cyprus	was	established	under	the	signature	of	three	guarantor	
states,	ıt	did	not	unfortunately	work,	and	the	republic	came	to	a	tragic	end	with	
the	Bloody	Christmas.	The	events	leading	to	the	overthrow	of	the	constitutional	
structure	 of	 the	 republic,	 Makarios’	 attempts	 to	 demolish	 the	 governmental	
system	disregarding	and	ignoring	the	equal	rights	and	the	existence	of	the	Turkish	
Cypriots	on	the	island	caused	nothing	but	the	turmoil,	chaos,	and	finally	Bloody	
Christmas.	Megali	Idea	obsession	coming	with	Enosis	target	never	lessened	the	
tension	in	Cyprus,	but	high-rocketed	the	communal	dispute,	fighting	and	the	
tyranny	there.	Doing	so,	the	republic	lived	only	3	years	and	4	months.	Not	only	
the	President	himself	but	also	even	the	Minister	of	 Interior	Affairs	Policarpos	
Yorgacis	had	a	great	intention	to	butcher	the	innocent	Turkish	Cypriots	on	the	
island,	 and	naturally	 such	 a	 republic	 having	 such	 bloody-handed	persons	 in	
charge	could	last	no	longer,	and	it	didn’t.	Makarios	himself	was	very	confident	
that	 the	 newly-established	 government	 and	 the	 administration	 on	 the	 island	
were	just	a	forward	step	and	a	stepping	stone	to	serve	the	aim	of	eventual	Enosis.	
Even	after	the	very	signature	day	of	the	London	Treaty,	Makarios	had	told	the	
ones	who	came	to	welcome	him	that	his	Enosis	struggle	on	the	 island	would	
continue.	 Such	 an	 archbishop	 and	 the	 president	was	 surely	 unable	 to	 follow	
Bloody Christmas Of 1963 In Cyprus In The Light Of American...
269
ÇTTAD, XIII/26, (2013/Bahar)
the	constitutional	rights	for	all	the	communities	living	on	the	island,	and	he	did	
what	he	planned	with	his	associates	such	as	Yerogadjis,	Papadopoulos,	and	the	
others,	assassinating	the	governmental	structure	of	the	republic	and	caused	the	
republic	to	demolish	on	November	21,	1963.	
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